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1. Introduction
A trade union is usually dened as an organization \whose purpose is to
improve the material welfare of members, principally by raising wages above the
competitive level." [Booth (1995), p. 51]. This paper considers a trade union
acting in this way and asks whether and how it aects economic growth.
The argument that leads us to answer these questions points to the link be-
tween the distribution of factor incomes and aggregate savings. It is well estab-
lished [see, e.g., Bertola (1993, 1996)] that the growth performance of an economy
is closely related to aggregate savings, i.e., to the part of aggregate output used for
capital formation. In turn, aggregate savings are linked to the factor-income distri-
bution if the propensities to save out of wage and capital income in the economy do
not coincide. Therefore institutions or policies that impinge on the factor-income
distribution are likely to aect economic growth.
The central idea of this paper is that a centralized trade union may qualify as
such an institution. Indeed, a union that succeeds in shifting income away from
the owners of capital to the workers by raising wages above the competitive level
may foster growth if the economy's propensity to save out of wage income exceeds
its propensity to save out of capital income.
The study of this idea requires an analytical framework which allows for ag-
gregate savings to be endogenously linked to both the factor-income distribution
of the economy and the rate of economic growth. For simplicity we consider a two-
period overlapping generations (OLG) economy exposed to endogenous growth a
la Romer (1986). We introduce a monopoly union which sets wages at the begin-
ning of each period so as to maximize an objective function having the real wage
and the level of employment of union members as its arguments. The notion of
a \trade union objective" refers to the relative weight a union attaches to either
argument.
We analyze balanced growth equilibria and use the equilibrium under laissez-
faire as a benchmark to which we relate the equilibrium with unionized labor. The
comparison allows us to determine a range of trade union objectives and conditions
on the aggregate technology so that the equilibrium with unionized labor exhibits
faster per capita income growth. The intuition behind these ndings is as follows.
In an OLG economy savings are closely linked to the economy's wage income as
only (young) workers save. Therefore, a union policy that raises aggregate wage
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income spurs economic growth. In turn, this is possible if the aggregate technology
is such that the eect of a reduction in employment due to wages above laissez-
faire levels induces a pronounced shift in the factor-income distribution in favor of
wage incomes but only a small reduction in aggregate output.
Having identied the growth eects of unionized labor, we consider its impact
on individual welfare. We nd that unionized labor may lead to higher welfare
of all generations that adhere to a union if it has a strong positive eect on per
capita income growth. This is because the old of each generation suer a loss in
capital income which has to be oset against the increase in wage income. The
negative eect on the old arises as unemployment lowers the marginal productivity
of capital implying a reduced rate of return on old age savings. For the same reason,
introducing a labor union cannot be Pareto-improving as the current old will only
be aected by the union's policy in the form of reduced old age capital income.
There are two strands of the literature on economic growth which are related
to the present paper. The rst strand includes papers on endogenous growth
and labor market imperfections such as Agell and Lommerud (1993), Cahuc and
Michel (1996), and Hellwig and Irmen (1999). Agell and Lommerud consider a
labor union that pursues an egalitarian wage policy. They show that the union may
foster structural change in favor of increased productivity growth by compressing
wage dierentials between low-productivity and high-productivity sectors. Related
arguments are employed by Cahuc and Michel and Hellwig and Irmen who consider
minimumwage legislation. These authors show that minimumwages may move the
economy towards more human capital respectively knowledge intensive production
again stimulating per capita income growth.
The second line of research studies the growth eects of intergenerational
transfers. Saint-Paul (1992), Wiedmer (1996), and Wigger (1999), among others,
demonstrate that intergenerational transfers from young to old generations in the
form of pay-as-you-go public pensions tend to lower per capita income growth by
discouraging private savings and investment. For a similar reason, policies that
imply transfers from the old to the young may foster growth as they are likely
to stimulate private savings. In fact, Jones and Manuelli (1992) demonstrate
that tax-nanced transfers from the old to the young augment per capita income
growth. A similar argument underlies Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) who consider a
policy that by shifting the tax burden away from labor to capital income moves
the tax burden from the young to the old which again may have a positive impact
on growth.
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In light of these contributions we can state our results as follows. A union
formed by the working young which succeeds in raising the aggregate wage bill
eectively transfers resources from the dissaving old to the saving young which, in
turn, may lead to higher aggregate savings and per capita income growth.
We establish and discuss our results in the following ve sections. Section
2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 studies the competitive equilibrium which
serves as a benchmark for the subsequent analysis. Our main result is presented
in Section 4 where we study the equilibrium with unionized labor and highlight
the link between the union's objective and economic growth. Section 5 analyzes
the welfare implications of the equilibrium with unionized labor. Finally, Section
6 considers some extensions and discusses the robustness of our results.
2. The Model
2.1. The Household Sector
The household sector has a simple overlapping generations structure a la
Samuelson (1956) and Diamond (1965). Each generation is represented by a single
individual who lives for two periods. In the rst period the individual supplies
labor out of her initial labor endowment which is normalized to one, and receives
wage income. This income is used to consume and to save. In the second period
of life the individual retires and lives on the proceeds of her savings.
An individual born at time t draws utility from young and old age consump-
tion. Lifetime utility u
t
is determined by:
u
t
= u
 
c
y
t
; c
o
t+1

;
where c
y
t
and c
o
t+1
denote young and old age consumption, respectively. For sim-
plicity we assume the utility function u to take the form u
 
c
y
t
; c
o
t+1

= ln c
y
t
+
 ln c
o
t+1
; with 0 <  < 1 as the discount factor common to all generations. It
is well known that this specication neutralizes income and substitution eects
associated with changes in the interest rate.
1
Each generation takes the real wage
w
t
in t and the real interest rate r
t+1
on savings from t to t + 1 as given and
1
See Section 6 for a discussion of how a more general utility function would aect
our results.
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maximizes lifetime utility under the constraints:
c
y
t
+ s
t
 w
t
L
t
;
c
o
t+1
 (1 + r
t+1
) s
t
;
L
t
 minf
^
L
t
; 1g;
where s
t
is savings in t; L
t
is the actual labor supply, and
^
L
t
is a quantity con-
straint on employment which is binding whenever
^
L
t
is less than 1. The dierence
1  
^
L
t
is to be interpreted as the rate of (involuntary) unemployment in t which
results from rationing of the representative individual's labor supply. Our speci-
cation of unemployment does not distinguish between employed and unemployed
individuals. This modeling strategy allows to abstract from intragenerational het-
erogeneity and focuses on the intergenerational implications of unemployment and
economic growth.
The optimal consumption plan is implicitly determined by:
u
1;t
= (1 + r
t+1
)u
2;t
;
where u
1;t
and u
2;t
are the partial derivatives of u at
 
c
y
t
; c
o
t+1

. For logarithmic
utility this involves the following savings function:
s
t
=

1 + 
w
t
L
t
: (1)
Moreover, given that an individual does not care about leisure, she always desires
to supply as much labor as possible so that:
L
t
= minf
^
L
t
; 1g:
2.2. The Production Sector
Identical rms hire the aggregate capital stock,K
t
; and demand labor supplied
by the young. Both factors are used to produce a homogeneous good according
to a neoclassical production function F (K
it
; A
t
L
it
), where K
it
and L
it
are capital
and labor inputs hired by rm i, whereas A
t
is an index of the economy-wide stock
of knowledge in t: The function F exhibits constant returns to scale and satises
standard concavity and dierentiability conditions.
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Factor markets are competitive in the sense that rms take factor prices as
given. In equilibrium all rms produce with the same capital intensity so that
K
it
=A
t
L
it
= K
t
=A
t
L
t
 k
t
. The respective rst order conditions for prot maxi-
mization are:
r
t
= f
0
(k
t
) ;
w
t
= A
t
[f (k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
)] ;
where f(k
t
)  F (k
t
; 1) with f
0
> 0 and f
00
< 0.
We endogenize productivity growth following Arrow (1962), Sheshinski (1967),
and Romer (1986) as a \learning-by-investing" eect, i.e.,
A
t
= K
t
: (2)
Hence, an increase in the aggregate stock of capital augments the stock of knowl-
edge available in the economy one-to-one. An immediate implication of (2) is that
the economy produces with a capital intensity k
t
= 1=L
t
so that factor prices
become:
r
t
= f
0
(1=L
t
) ; (3)
w
t
= !(L
t
)K
t
; with !(L
t
) = f(1=L
t
)  f
0
(1=L
t
)=L
t
: (4)
Equation (4) implies that for a given level of employment the wage rate is pro-
portional to the aggregate stock of capital. The factor of proportionality !(L
t
)
represents the external return on capital per unit of employed labor caused by the
spillover from cumulated investment on labor productivity. Indeed, if productivity
growth stems from (2), aggregate production is determined by Y
t
= F (K
t
; K
t
L
t
).
In addition, if factor prices are determined by (3) and (4), one nds that the social
return on capital is dY
t
=dK
t
= r
t
+ !(L
t
)L
t
. Since the productivity enhancing
eect of aggregate investment is not priced, the social return on capital exceeds its
private counterpart where !(L
t
)L
t
is the external return that accrues to employed
labor.
For further reference, observe that:
dr
t
=dL
t
=  f
00
(1=L
t
) =L
2
t
> 0; (5)
dw
t
=dL
t
= K
t
d! (L
t
) =dL
t
= K
t
f
00
(1=L
t
) =L
3
t
< 0; (6)
i.e., a higher employment per rm raises the marginal productivity of the existing
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capital and lowers the marginal productivity of labor.
3. The Competitive Equilibrium
Before introducing a trade union we make a short detour and quickly recall the
(perfect foresight) equilibrium under full employment which serves as a benchmark
for the subsequent analysis.
Given an initial level of capital K
0
owned by the old generation, a competitive
equilibrium determines a sequence fs
t
; c
y
t
; c
o
t
; w
t
; r
t
; K
t+1
; L
t
; A
t
g
1
t=0
such that:
(E1) each generation t saves according to (1),
(E2) for all t aggregate savings equals aggregate investment: s
t
= K
t+1
;
(E3) for all t there is full employment: L
t
= 1;
(E4) for all t the factor price conditions (3) and (4) hold.
The unique competitive equilibrium is a balanced growth equilibrium with a
constant interest rate and a constant growth rate of wages, capital, and per capita
output. Indeed, from (E3) and (E4) one nds that for all t the following holds:
r
t
= r

= f
0
(1) ;
w
t
= w

t
= K
t
!(1); (7)
where the latter implies that wages and capital grow at the same pace. From (E1),
(E2), and (E3) one nds that capital accumulation in all periods obeys to:

1 + 
w
t
= K
t+1
:
Substituting for w
t
employing (7) gives:

1 + 
!(1) =
K
t+1
K
t
:
Hence, the laissez-faire growth rate, g

, of capital, per capita output, and wages
can be written as:
g

=

1 + 
!(1)  1:
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As g

is independent of time, the system jumps immediately to the balanced
growth equilibrium.
4. Introducing a Trade Union
4.1. The Union's Objective
The trade union is formed by the working population. The OLG structure
set out above implies that only the young of each period are union members.
Each generation of union members is only concerned with the wage policy that
determines its own labor income. In other words, the current generation of union
members cannot commit future generations to a certain wage policy.
Following Pencavel (1984) we model union preferences over pairs of wages
and levels of employment in t. More precisely, the union evaluates a tuple (w
t
; L
t
)
according to the function:
V
t
= V (w
t
; L
t
) = (w
t
  w

t
)

L
1 
t
: (8)
The rst argument in (8) is a wage mark-up dened as the dierence between the
actual and the competitive wage. The second argument is the rate of employment
in t. The parameter  2 (0; 1) determines how much weight the union attaches to
wages and employment, respectively.
The union rationally anticipates aggregate labor demand which results from
the rms' prot maximizing behavior. Considering equations (4) and (7), (8) can
be written as:
V
t
= K

t
[!(L
t
)  !(1)]

L
1 
t
:
As K
t
is predetermined at time t, the union's maximization problem reduces to:
max
0L
t
1
~
V (L
t
) = [!(L
t
)  !(1)]

L
1 
t
:
The solution is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Denote (L
t
) =  d ln!(L
t
)=d lnL
t
the elasticity of !(L
t
). Then,
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for all  satisfying
0 <  <   lim
L
t
!0
1
1 + (L
t
)
; (9)
the union's maximization problem has an interior solution
^
L
t
2 (0; 1) given
in implicit form by :
!(
^
L
t
)
!(1)
=
1  
1     (
^
L
t
)
: (10)
Proof : See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 states a condition for an interior solution to the union's max-
imization problem. Since the union attaches some weight to wages ( > 0), the
chosen level of employment falls short of full employment. On the other hand,
condition (9) gives an upper bound on the weight on wages so that the union
never chooses to reduce employment to zero.
Equation (10) shows that the chosen level of employment
^
L
t
relates the wage
mark-up to the available technology via the elasticity  and the preference pa-
rameter : In view of (4),  is the elasticity of wages with respect to the level of
employment. To get more intuition for the economics implied by (10), it is useful
to link  to the elasticity of substitution between capital and eÆcient labor and
to the output elasticity of eÆcient labor.
Lemma 1. Let (L
t
) denote the elasticity of substitution between capital K
t
and labor in eÆciency units A
t
L
t
; and "(L
t
) the output elasticity of labor in
eÆciency units. Then, (L
t
) can be written as:
(L
t
) =
1  "(L
t
)
(L
t
)
: (11)
Proof : Considering equations (4) and (6), (L
t
) becomes:
(L
t
) =
f
00
L
t
(L
t
f   f
0
)
;
where the argument of f is 1=L
t
. Straightforward manipulation of the right hand
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side leads to (11), where:
"(L
t
) = 1 
f
0
L
t
f
and (L
t
) =  
f
0
f
(L
t
f   f
0
)
f
00
: Q :E :D :
In light of Lemma 1 condition (10) becomes:
!(
^
L
t
)
!(1)
=
(1  )(
^
L
t
)
(1  )(
^
L
t
)   [1  "(
^
L
t
)]
:
This form reveals that the resulting wage mark-up is inversely related to both
the elasticity of substitution between capital and eÆcient labor and the output
elasticity of eÆcient labor. The economic intuition behind this result is as follows.
If capital and labor in eÆciency units become better substitutes, setting wages
above the competitive level becomes more costly in terms of foregone employment.
As a consequence, the union chooses a higher level of employment and the wage
mark{up falls. Furthermore, if the output elasticity of eÆcient labor is high,
a reduction in employment has a substantial impact on aggregate output and,
henceforth, on the share of output that accrues to labor. This implies that the
costs associated with a reduction in employment are high which induces the union
to choose a small mark-up.
Condition (10) implicitly relates employment to the union's preference pa-
rameter .
Lemma 2. d
^
L
t
=d < 0 for all  2 (0; ) and lim
!0
^
L
t
= 1:
Proof : Applying the implicit function theorem to the rst-order condition
of the union's maximization problem and considering the respective second-order
condition gives the result. Q.E.D.
As expected the chosen level of unemployment increases as the union attaches
more weight to the wage mark-up. Yet, as (9) shows,  must be bounded from
above. In light of Lemma 1, the upper bound  becomes:
  lim
L
t
!0
(L
t
)
(L
t
) + 1  "(L
t
)
:
The following CES example demonstrates how  depends on the elasticity of
substitution. The bound  is equal to 1 if the elasticity of substitution is smaller
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than 1 and strictly smaller than 1 otherwise. Moreover, the relationship between
 and the elasticity of substitution is discontinuous and non-monotonic.
Example 1. In the CES case the production function takes the form:
Y
t
=
h
K
 1

t
+ (1  )(A
t
L
t
)
 1

i

 1
;
where  is constant by denition. Straightforward algebra yields:
"(L
t
) = 1 
L
1 

t
L
1 

t
+ 1  
;
implying:
lim
L
t
!0
"(L
t
) =
(
1 if  < 1,
1   if  = 1,
0 if  > 1.
It follows that:
 =
8
<
:
1 if  < 1,
1=(1 + ) if  = 1,
=(1 + ) if  > 1.
4.2. Equilibrium with Unionized Labor
A perfect foresight equilibrium with unionized labor determines a sequence
fs
t
; c
y
t
; c
o
t
; w
t
; r
t
; K
t+1
; L
t
; A
t
g
1
t=0
given K
0
which satises (E1), (E2), and (E4)
stated in Section 3 and the following labor market equilibrium condition:
(E3') L
t
=
^
L
t
for all t,
which states that the level of employment in the economy is determined as
the quantity of labor that maximizes the union's objective. Clearly, for each
rm the corresponding wage is binding so that the equilibrium wage becomes
w
t
= w^
t
= !(
^
L
t
)K
t
.
From the union's problem it can be inferred that the optimal choice of em-
ployment is time-invariant, i.e.,
^
L
t
=
^
L. Thus, from a similar reasoning as applied
in Section 3 it follows that the equilibrium exhibits a constant interest r^ = f
0
(
^
L)
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and a constant growth rate. The latter is given by:
g^ =

1 + 
!(
^
L)
^
L  1: (12)
From Lemma 2 we can infer that
^
L is a continuous function of  in a neighborhood
of  = 0. Thus, as g^ is a continuous function of
^
L, it follows that for  suÆciently
small, the equilibrium growth rate g^ can be written as a continuous function
g^ = g^() relating union preferences to the growth rate of per capita income. The
following proposition states a condition on the technology and on union preferences
under which the growth rate of the equilibrium with unionized labor exceeds the
growth rate of the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Let (1)+"(1) < 1: Then, there is some ~ 2 (0; ) so that g^ > g

for all  2 (0; ~).
Proof : From (12) one easily observes that the growth rate for an arbitrary level
of employment L takes the form g = =(1+)!(L)L 1. Dierentiation of g with
respect to L gives dg=dL = =(1+)!(L) [1 (L)]. Hence, dg=dLj
L=1
< 0 if and
only if (1) > 1. From Lemma 1 the latter is equivalent to (1) + "(1) < 1: Then
the proposition follows from Lemma 2 and the continuity of g^ in the neighborhood
of  = 0. Q.E.D.
The intuitive argument behind this result is as follows. The total eect of
a reduction in employment due to unionization can be decomposed in an eect
on the functional distribution of income and an output eect. The former occurs
as for a given output a reduction in employment increases the wage rate and
reduces the interest rate. The distribution eect is measured by the elasticity of
substitution between capital and eÆcient labor . As is well known, the labor
share of aggregate income will increase if the elasticity of substitution is smaller
than one. However, an increase in the labor share is not suÆcient to increase
total labor income (the wage bill) and, in light of (12), the growth rate. This
is because a reduction in employment reduces aggregate output, i.e., causes a
negative output eect. The output eect on the wage bill and the growth rate
is measured by the output elasticity of eÆcient labor ". Since " is the share of
aggregate output that accrues to labor, it measures to what extend labor income
is reduced when aggregate production falls. In sum, for the growth rate to exceed
the competitive level (g^ > g

) the technology must be such that the eect of a
12 Trade Union Objectives and Economic Growth
reduction in employment on the functional distribution of income in favor of labor
more than outweighs the eect on aggregate output that accrues to labor. If this
is the case, the aggregate wage bill rises and triggers a positive eect on aggregate
savings and growth.
5. Unionization and Welfare
This section studies the welfare eects that materialize when the economy
moves away from full employment to an equilibrium with a constant level of un-
employment in all periods.
2
We want to know how the welfare of current and
future generations changes when such a switch takes place. To answer this ques-
tion, we rst consider a marginal reduction in employment which occurs in period
t = 0 and is maintained throughout all future periods and analyze its impact on
the lifetime utility of all generations. Subsequently, we relate the welfare results to
the ndings of the previous section and provide a link between union objectives,
economic growth, and individual welfare.
Suppose the economy is on an equilibrium path with L
t
= L, r
t
= r, and
a constant growth rate g of capital, per capita output, and wages, and consider
a constant and permanent marginal reduction in employment (dL < 0) at time
t = 0. Then, the welfare of the current old, the current young, and all yet unborn
generations are aected as follows.
The Current Old. The welfare of the old at time t = 0 is given by:
u
 1
= u[w
 1
L
 1
  s
 1
; (1 + r) s
 1
];
where w
 1
, L
 1
and s
 1
are predetermined at time t = 0. Dierentiating with
respect to the level of employment gives:
du
 1
dL
= u
2; 1
dr
dL
s
 1
;
2
Thus, we consider the welfare eects that are associated with intergenerational trans-
fers from the old to the young via a change in the factor income distribution. For
a comprehensive analysis of the welfare eects of intergenerational transfers in en-
dogenous growth economies see Wigger (2001).
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so that in view of (5) one nds:
du
 1
dL
=  u
2; 1
f
00
L
2
s
 1
> 0: (13)
Thus, a reduction in employment reduces the welfare of the current old. This
is due to a capital income eect. It occurs as the marginal productivity of the
existing capital stock shrinks when employment falls. This reduces the return on
old age savings and, henceforth, consumption of the current old.
The Current Young. Welfare of the young at time t = 0 is given by:
u
0
= u[w
0
L  s
0
; (1 + r) s
0
]:
A marginal decrease in employment at time t = 0 and t = 1 leads to (considering
the Envelope theorem and the fact that K
0
is predetermined at time 0):
du
0
dL
= u
1;0
d(w
0
L)
dL
+ u
2;0
s
0
dr
dL
:
Replacing w
0
by !(L)K
0
and considering that u
1;0
= (1 + r)u
2;0
and s
0
= K
1
=
(1 + g)K
0
, this can be written as:
du
0
dL
= u
1;0

d!
dL
L+ !(L) +
1 + g(L)
1 + r(L)
dr
dL

K
0
: (14)
Thus, what matters for the welfare of the current young is the impact of a decrease
in L on the current wage bill (wage income eect) and on the discounted capital
income which accrues in t = 1 to the capital stock 1 + g times as large as in t = 0
(capital income eect). Again, the latter eect is negative. To evaluate the overall
eect, substitute (4), (5), and (6) into (14) to get after some manipulations:
du
0
dL
= u
1;0
f
00
f
f
0
L

1  (L)  "(L) 
1 + g(L)
1 + r(L)
[1  "(L)]

K
0
: (15)
It will be seen below that this expression permits a very straightforward interpre-
tation of the eects of a reduction in employment on the welfare of the current
young.
Future Generations. The utility of some generation l 2 N is given by:
u
l
= u[w
l
L  s
l
; (1 + r) s
l
]:
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Considering that w
l
= !(L)K
l
, K
l
= (1 + g)
l
K
0
, and 1 + g = (=(1 + ))!(L)L,
u
l
becomes:
u
l
= u
"
[!(L)L]
l+1


1 + 

l
K
0
  s
l
; (1 + r) s
l
#
:
Dierentiating with respect to L and considering that s
l
= (1 + g)K
l
and u
1;l
=
(1 + r)u
2;l
, one obtains after some manipulations:
du
l
dL
= u
1;l

(l + 1)

d!
dL
L+ !

+
1 + g(L)
1 + r(L)
dr
dL

K
l
:
This expression generalizes (14) to the case of l > 0. Again, there is a capital
income eect which has the same interpretation as the one in (14). However,
now there is a cumulated wage income eect. This is because the reduction in
employment dL does not only impinge on the wage bill in t = l but also on the
wage bill in all preceding periods t  0. A similar procedure as above leads to:
du
l
dL
= u
1;l
f
00
f
f
0
L

(l + 1) [1  "(L)  (L)] 
1 + g(L)
1 + r(L)
[1  "(L)]

K
l
:
From this equation and equations (13) and (15) the following inferences can
be drawn:
Proposition 3.
i) A reduction in employment cannot be Pareto-improving.
ii) A reduction in employment increases the welfare of generation 0 if and only
if:
(L) + "(L) +
1 + g(L)
1 + r(L)
[1  "(L)] < 1:
iii) There is some l 2 N so that a reduction in employment increases the welfare
of generation l and all subsequent generations if:
(L) + "(L) < 1:
Part i) follows immediately from the observation that a marginal reduction in
employment in period 0 hurts the old whose level of consumption solely relies on
capital income. All later generations suer similar losses in capital income when
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old. Yet, they may benet from a wage income eect when young. Considering
the analysis in Section 4 wage and capital income eects can be expressed in terms
of distribution and output eects. In fact, part ii) of Proposition 3 states that the
generation of the current young will benet from a reduction in employment if
the shift from capital income of generation  1 to labor income of generation 0,
i.e. the distribution eect, outweighs the output eects arising at time 0 and time
1. The distribution eect is strong if  is low (see Section 4). The output eects
occur in terms of reduced labor income when young and reduced capital income
when old. At time 0 the share of a reduction in aggregate output born by the
wage earning generation 0 is equal to " (the labor share). At time 1 generation
0 is interest earner and the respective share is equal to 1   " (the capital share).
Naturally, one has to consider that the output eect at t = 1 is 1 + g times larger
than at t = 0 and that it must be discounted with the rate r. Part iii) states that
a reduction in employment at time t = 0 increases the welfare of some generation
l and all subsequent generations if it generates a rise in per capita income growth
(see Proposition 2). This is because the wage income eect cumulates over time
and eventually dominates the capital income eect so that generation l and all
subsequent generations benet from the permanent reduction in employment at
time 0.
The link between welfare, union objectives, and growth is now easily estab-
lished.
Corollary 1. Let
(1) + "(1) +
1 + g(1)
1 + r(1)
[1  "(1)] < 1: (16)
Then, there is some
~
~ 2 (0; ) so that g^ > g

for all  2
 
0;
~
~

and the welfare
of all generations which adhere to the union is improved.
Proof : By part ii) of Proposition 3, condition (16) implies that dL < 0
increases the welfare of each generation t  0 which adheres to the union. Since,
condition (16) implies (1)+"(1) < 1, the claim follows with Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1 gives the local condition under which a marginal rise in wages
above the competitive level and the associated decrease in employment augments
the welfare of all generations but generation  1. It emphasizes that there are union
preferences of the type (8) so that a union actually chooses a level of employment
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which increases both per capita income growth and welfare of all generations but
the current old.
6. Discussion
Union Preferences. The preceding analysis can be used to assess the im-
plications for growth of alternative union's objective functions discussed in the
literature. Consider rst the total wage bill maximization approach advocated by
Dunlop (1944). Given the simple growth model with externalities from capital
formation, the wage bill maximization approach implies that the union chooses a
level of employment that leads to maximum growth. Consider next the case of a
rents-from-unionization objective emphasized by Rosen (1969), de Menil (1971),
and Calvo (1978), among others. The union objective function that we have em-
ployed in this paper converges to this case if the weight the union puts on wages,
, approaches 1/2. The union then chooses a level of employment which denitely
falls short of the growth maximizing one. It may be the case that the growth rate
of the unionized economy falls short of the competitive level, even though the local
condition for unionization to stimulate economic growth stated in Proposition 2
holds true. Finally, consider a utility oriented approach, suggested, e.g., by Far-
ber (1978) and Oswald (1982), in which the union's objective coincides with the
individual objectives of its members. From equation (15) it can be inferred that in
the present OLG framework such a union chooses a level of employment
^
L which
satises:
(
^
L) + "(
^
L) +
1 + g(
^
L)
1 + r(
^
L)
[1  "(
^
L)]  1; with = if
^
L < 1;
i.e., which maximizes lifetime utility of the union's members at each point in time.
In fact, if
^
L < 1, the union chooses a level of employment which leads to higher
growth than obtained in a competitive economy but not to maximum growth.
This is because a union which maximizes lifetime utility of its members also takes
into account the negative eect of unemployment on capital income born by its
members when old.
Length of Lifetimes. The conditions for a labor union fostering per capita
income growth derived in this paper are closely linked to the assumption of a two-
period overlapping generations structure. In this economy only young individuals
save so that aggregate savings exclusively stem from labor income. If individual
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lifetimes extend to more than two periods, the conditions for a monopoly union
to spur economic growth can be expected to be more restrictive. This is because
in such a framework savings generally do not only stem from labor but also from
capital income. In this case the negative capital income eect of unionization
discussed in Section 5 will have a dampening eect on aggregate savings and,
henceforth, on growth. In the extreme case of innite lifetimes our results would
be reversed. As has been shown by Bertola (1993) in such a framework savings
stem solely from capital income implying that a redistribution from capitalists to
workers necessarily reduces economic growth.
Savings Function. By conning attention to logarithmic utility we excluded
that savings depends on the interest rate. If we considered a savings function with
the interest as one of its arguments, the conditions for unionization to stimulate
economic growth would either be more or less restrictive, depending on whether
savings would be positively or negatively related to the interest rate. If savings are
increasing in the interest rate, the negative eect of unionization on the interest
rate lowers aggregate savings and exerts a depressing eect on per capita income
growth. If, on the other hand, savings are negatively related to the interest rate,
the same reasoning points to a further positive eect of unionization on growth.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
It is easily veried that
~
V (L
t
) > 0 for some L
t
2 (0; 1). Thus, as
~
V (1) = 0 it
follows that
^
L
t
< 1. Next, consider
~
V (L
t
! 0). If
~
V (L
t
! 0) = 0, the preceding
argument reveals that
^
L
t
> 0: Thus, assume that
~
V (L
t
! 0) > 0. This implies
that !(L
t
! 0) =1. We demonstrate that this leads to lim
L
t
!0
d
~
V =dL
t
> 0 for
 < . Dierentiation of
~
V with respect to L
t
yields:
d
~
V
dL
t
= [!(L
t
)  !(1)]
 1
L
 
t


d!(L
t
)
dL
t
L
t
+ (1  )[!(L
t
)  !(1)]

;
which can be written in the form
d
~
V
dL
t
=
~
V (L
t
)
[!(L
t
)  !(1)]L
t
	;
where
	  
d!(L
t
)
dL
t
L
t
+ (1  )[!(L
t
)  !(1)]:
Since ! (L
t
) > 0 for all L
t
; it follows that 	 > 0 if:
  (L
t
) + (1  )

1 
!(1)
!(L
t
)

> 0:
From the latter and !(L
t
! 0) =1 it follows that 	 > 0 if  <  as given in (9).
To demonstrate that
~
V (L
t
)=[(!(L
t
)   !(1))L
t
] > 0 for L
t
! 0; it is suÆcient to
show that lim
L
t
!0
[(! (L
t
)  ! (1))L
t
] = 0 since by assumption
~
V (L
t
! 0) > 0.
This, in turn, holds true since:
lim
L
t
!0
[!(L
t
)  !(1)]L
t
= lim
L
t
!0
!(L
t
)L
t
  0
= lim
L
t
!0

f

1
L
t

 
1
L
t
f
0

1
L
t

L
t
= lim
k
t
!1
f(k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
)
k
t
= lim
k
t
!1
f(k
t
)
k
t
  lim
k
t
!1
f
0
(k
t
) = 0:
Thus, lim
L
t
!0
d
~
V =dL
t
> 0. Q.E.D.
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